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ESSAY
SELECTING THE SUPREMES: THE APPOINTMENT OF
JUDGES TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Peter McCormick*
I. INTRODUCTION
The classic problem in political theory and institutional
design is the simple question, "Who shall guard the guardians?"
Especially when judicial power is an increasingly visible
dimension of legitimate political authority, a challenge of
comparable significance is, "Who shall appoint the judges?"--
particularly the judges of the nation's highest court. For much of
the country's history, Canadians have shown a surprising
indifference to this question, despite the fact that our southern
neighbours from their beginning established a check-and-
balance mechanism for this important function. The fact that the
use of that mechanism has been sporadically controversial has
somehow always seemed to suggest only that the Americans had
gotten the answer wrong, not that Canadians had somehow
missed the question.
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But a new Canadian prime minister may have nudged the
country beyond its indifference. Shortly after taking office in
December 2003, Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin spoke of
the need to address a "democratic deficit," with the appointment
of Supreme Court judges as one element of this larger problem.
He promised to make the process more transparent and more
accountable, and charged the House of Commons Justice
Committee with conducting public hearings in order to come up
with a set of recommendations or alternatives. The context of
these comments was an anticipated retirement in 2006, but they
became more pressing in the spring of 2004 when two Supreme
Court justices unexpectedly announced their retirement. As if to
demonstrate precisely what was at stake, the Supreme Court
ended the term with several five-to-four decisions, including the
clearest statement to date of the meaning of "freedom of
religion" under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1
The reduction of the Liberals to a weak minority position in the
June election highlighted the anomaly of an unfettered Prime
Ministerial discretion in making appointments; but when two
new Supreme Court appointments were announced in August
2004, the "new" process involved only the most minimal of
concessions.
With that recent history as background, this paper will
begin by identifying five important but easily overlooked
differences between the American and Canadian judicial
systems. From that point, it will describe the Supreme Court of
Canada and its place in the Canadian judicial system, explain the
appointed process for the Court and the way this process has
changed in recent decades, identify the major challenges in
devising a functional appointment process, and describe and
discuss some of the proposals that have been made for change.
1. The two cases were Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselem 2004 SCC 47 and
Congrigation des t~moins de Jkhovah de St-Jjr6me-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village)
2004 SCC 48; both were handed down on June 30, 2004. Even more intriguing: The five-
judge majority in both cases included both the judges (Arbour and Iacobucci) who have
since retired from the Court.
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II. THE CANADIAN AND AMERICAN COURT STRUCTURES
BRIEFLY COMPARED
At first glance, the Canadian and American judicial
systems-and specifically the place of the respective Supreme
Courts within them-could scarcely be more similar. Viewed in
a global context, this initial impression is fully justified. Both
high courts operate within a federal system based upon the
English common law, assuming generalist judges with explicit
and effective guarantees of judicial independence; multi-judge
panel appeal courts immediately below the highest court; and
solo-judge trials (sometimes with juries) in the courts of first
resort. These characteristics sharply differentiate them from the
world's most common and most widely imitated judicial system,
the continental European model.
At the same time, however, the similarities do not run as
deep as might at first be assumed, and several discontinuities are
important:
First: The United States Supreme Court is fully entrenched
within the American Constitution; although Congress may make
some constrained unilateral interventions regarding its
jurisdiction and procedure, the basic elements of the Supreme
Court and its practices are protected not only by a strong public
opinion but also by a formal document that can only be altered
through difficult formal procedures. 2 The Supreme Court of
Canada, by contrast, appears only in the form of a permissive
clause in the Constitution Act 1867, 3 and was created (and
continues to be sustained) by a simple Act of Parliament, several
times amended, which defines the institution, its composition, its
jurisdiction, and its practices.4  Although the subsequent
2. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (establishing Supreme Court); U.S. Const. art. V
(describing procedures for amendment of Constitution).
3. 30 & 31 Victoria (U.K.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const./c1867_e.
html. The relevant provision is in Art. VII c. 101 (accessed Feb. 22, 2005; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
4. The current version of the Supreme Court Act is available at http://laws.justice.
gc.ca/en/S-26/text.html (accessed Feb. 22, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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Constitution Act 19825 purports to put some features of the SCC
beyond simple parliamentary control (such as the "composition"
of the Court), this is done in such a clumsy fashion that many
constitutional experts believe these clauses to be of no effect at
all, leaving the Court as an artefact of the legislative will of the
national Parliament.6
Second: Both the USSC and the SCC stand simultaneously
at the top of a structure of purely national courts and the parallel
pyramids of state and provincial courts; each is the highest court
of appeal and the source of binding authority for both sets of
courts. But in the United States, the overlap is not complete and
there is an important category of law-questions of the meaning
or the validity of purely state law-that cannot be referred to the
USSC. In Canada, the Constitution Act 1867 provides for the
establishment by Parliament of a "General Court of Appeal" and
there is no question of law that could not at least theoretically
rise to consideration on the merits by the Court.
Third: The American system of federal courts is extremely
extensive, comparable in terms of both the number of judges
(trial and appellate) and the size of its docket to the judicial
system of the largest of the states; but in Canada the federal
courts are much more modest in scope and jurisdiction,
comparable at most to one of the smaller provinces. (The
numbers for Nova Scotia provide the best fit.) This is reflected
in the caseload of the respective Supreme Courts: In recent
years, eighty-five percent of the docket of the USSC has been
devoted to appeals from the federal courts, and fifteen percent to
appeals from state courts; over the same period, the docket of
the SCC is a perfect mirror image, with eighty-five percent of
the cases coming from provincial courts and only fifteen percent
from the federal courts. It is also reflected in the personnel who
staff the respective courts: At present, and not atypically, seven
of the justices of the USSC have been elevated from federal
5. Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.). See id at Part V c. 41
(allowing for amendment of provisions relating to Supreme Court only upon resolutions of
the Senate, the House of Commons, and the legislative assembly of each province).
6. See e.g. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 78-79 (4th ed., Carswell
Leg. Publications 1997).
7. Peter McCormick, Elections, Presidents and American Federalism: The Lessons of
Bush versus Gore 2000, in Braving the New World: Readings in Contemporary Politics
221 (Thomas Bateman & Roger Epp, eds., 3d ed., Thompson Nelson Learning 2004).
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courts and one from a state court, while one came to the USSC
without prior judicial experience; but as a regular practice over
several decades, seven of the judges of the SCC have been
elevated from provincial courts of appeal, one from the federal
court, and one lacks prior judicial experience.
Fourth: In the United States, judges of the federal courts of
appeals and justices of the Supreme Court are appointed in
similar ways, but the staffing of state courts is completely
separate (and varies significantly from one state to another8 ); in
Canada, the staffing of the provincial superior courts (i.e., all but
the very lowest level of trial court), of the federal courts, and of
the Supreme Court itself is handled by the same set of
authorities on similar principles and criteria. There is therefore a
recurrent potential for friction between the higher state courts
and the USSC that has no counterpart in Canadian practice.
Fifth: It is widely accepted in American practice that
partisan differences have deeply penetrated the judiciary, less in
the sense of any patronage than in the form of ideological
differences that are both intentional and persistent. Judges
appointed by (or elected as) Democrats behave differently and
support different legal values and priorities than judges
appointed by (or elected as) Republicans, not to such an extent
that these different judges cannot engage in a professional
discourse and work from a considerable set of shared values and
procedures, but certainly to such an extent that any study of
judicial behavior will routinely include the partisan variable. In
Canada, the situation is rather different. Studies of judicial
behavior do not generally include the partisan variable and when
they do, it yields nothing of value; but, more importantly, it is
not generally accepted that the appointment process is or should
be driven by considerations of this sort.
This leaves us with something of a paradox: The Canadian
and American judicial systems in general, and their Supreme
Courts in particular, are arguably more similar to each other in
8. See e.g. Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the Comparative
Study of the Judiciary: The State Supreme Court Project, 22 Just. Sys. J. 243, 247 tbl. 1
(2003) (showing different selection methods for judges of state appellate courts) (available
from the National Center for State Courts at http://ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS-
AppCtsJSJV22No3.pdf) (accessed Feb. 22, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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more respects than either is to any other judicial system in the
world; but at the same time, there are important structural
differences between them that make casual generalization
extremely dangerous.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
A. The Early Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Canada was not created by the 1867
British North America Act,9 which is the closest thing to a
founding document as one can find in Canada's gradualist
evolution to full formal independence. There are several reasons
for what now appears to be a curious omission. One may simply
be that the notion of complete appellate hierarchies, topped by
national high courts, is standard today but was considerably less
so in the nineteenth century. 10 A second is that Canada already
had (and retained even after the creation of the Supreme Court)
a "higher" court in the form of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, a court-like body whose membership partially
overlapped the House of Lords, and which had ultimate judicial
authority over the off-island parts of the British Empire. And a
third was the reluctance of a not inconsiderable number of
Canadians-most critically, the French-Canadians of Quebec,
for whom a Supreme Court would necessarily be dominated by
their not-always-understanding English-Canadian compatriots-
to accept the authority of a national high court, which made the
distant Judicial Committee a more attractive and more plausibly
neutral final authority. A highly unpopular Judicial Committee
decision (dealing with the burial of a suicide in a Catholic
9. The British North America Act was subsequently renamed the Constitution Act
1867. See supra n. 3.
10. Until as recently as the 1960s, only some of the Canadian provinces had established
separate full-time courts of appeal to cap the provincial judicial hierarchy, with a number
of provinces relying instead on en bane panels drawn from the provincial superior trial
bench. The tenth and last province-Prince Edward Island-established its Court of
Appeal in 1987. Peter Russell, The Judiciary in Canada: The Third Branch of Government
(McGraw-Hill Ryerson 1987).
11. For a description of the Judicial Committee, see Peter McCormick, Supreme at
Last: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada ch. 2 (Lorimer 2000).
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cemetery)12 created the window of opportunity, however, and in
1875 the Canadian Parliament passed the Supreme Court Act
(although the Court was not strictly Supreme in that its decisions
could still be appealed to the Judicial Committee, and by mutual
agreement of both parties an appeal from a provincial court of
appeal could bypass the Supreme Court and go directly to the
Judicial Committee). 13
For a considerable period after its creation, the Supreme
Court of Canada did not enjoy a high profile or reputation.
Several factors contributed to this. One, of course, was the fact
that Canada did not then have an entrenched bill of rights, so the
Court's constitutional cases were almost entirely concerned with
the federal/provincial distribution of legislative powers. More
generally, judges were constrained by conventions directing a
strictly formalist, rather than a creative or activist, reading of
legal and constitutional texts. The second was that it existed
under the shadow of the Judicial Committee; it was not that an
inordinately large number of decisions were appealed, or that
they were reversed unusually frequently, but the Supreme Court
was diminished both by the possibility of appeal and also by the
rather casual indifference with which the Judicial Committee
often treated the Supreme Court's deliberations.1 4 And a third
was the high stature of some of the provincial courts of appeal,
most notably that of Ontario. To put it delicately, it was not
always the case that appointments to the Supreme Court could
draw the strongest candidates, and this created something of a
vicious circle: Appointment to a mediocre court was not
attractive to the best potential judges, but the court could not rise
above mediocrity until it began drawing stronger appointments.
12. Brown v. Les Cure et Marguilliers de /'Oeuvre et Fabrique de Notre Dame de
Montreal (1874) L.R. 6 P.C. 157. This decision is commonly referred to as the "Guibord
case." For an interesting discussion of the case, see Ian Bushnell, The Captive Court: A
Study of the Supreme Court of Canada 15-18 (McGill-Queen's U. Press 1992).
13. The bypass was not an uncommon procedure; a total of 667 cases were appealed to
the Judicial Committee after 1867, and 414 of them went directly from a provincial court
of appeal, bypassing the Supreme Court altogether. James G. Snell & Frederick Vaughan,
The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution 180 (U. Toronto Press 1985).
14. This is perhaps best illustrated by the famous occasion in the nineteenth century
when the Chief Justice of Canada announced a decision but declared that the Court would
not be delivering reasons because the losing party had already indicated an intention to
appeal and (he suggested) the Judicial Committee rarely paid any attention to the reasons.
McCormick, supra n. 11, at 9.
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When Americans debate who were the best USSC justices in
history, the lists reach right back to the early years; when
Canadians do so, the lists are completely dominated by recent
justices with at best one from the Court's second quarter-century
(Duff) and one from the third (Rand).
B. The "Truly Supreme" Supreme Court
It was not until 1949 that Canada formally ended appeals to
the Judicial Committee. A previous attempt having failed, the
amendment to the Supreme Court Act was delayed until an
advisory opinion of the Judicial Committee confirmed the
capacity of the Canadian Parliament validly to enact such a
measure. 15 At the same time, the Court was expanded to its
current size of nine justices, at least three of whom must be
appointed from the bar of the province of Quebec.' 6
There was clearly a double reason for the shift to an ending
of appeals beyond the Supreme Court of Canada. The more
general one was that it was a logical culmination of the shift
from Empire to Commonwealth, from countries subordinate to
the "Imperial Parliament" to kindred nations allied to Britain,
that had been formalized after World War I in the Statute of
Westminster. 17 In the light of this evolution, it became
increasingly anomalous for the all-but-formally independent
countries of the Commonwealth to remain subordinate to an
English quasi-court.' 8 The more specific reason was a profound
dissatisfaction with the way in which the Judicial Committee
had handled the question of the federal/provincial distribution of
15. A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can. (Privy Council App.) [1947] A.C. 127.
16. The reason for this guarantee of representation, not paralleled for any other
province, is the fact that Quebec is the only civil-code province in an otherwise common-
law country.
17. Statute of Westminster, 1931 (22 George V, ch. 4).
18. It is striking, however, to consider that decisions of the High Court of Australia
could be appealed to the Judicial Committee until 1985. See Australia Act of 1986 (No.
[142] of 1985) § 11 (available at http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/places/transcripts/cth
/cthpdf/cthl7 doc 1986.pdf) (accessed Mar. 11, 2005; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process). Similarly, New Zealand decided only in 2003 to end
appeals to the Judicial Committee. See Commonwealth Jurisdiction, Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/Page32.asp (noting that appeals
to the Privy Council from the Court of Appeal of New Zealand were abolished in 2003)
(accessed Mar. 7, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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legislative authority in the context of the economic crisis of the
Great Depression, hamstringing the ameliorative efforts of the
national government by a strict and narrow reading of the 1867
constitution. Many in the legal and political community
welcomed a patriation of judicial authority as a way of
developing a truly Canadian jurisprudence that would better
reflect Canadian circumstances and realities.
This being the case, it is anticlimactic to conclude that the
newly supreme Supreme Court was something of a
disappointment for several decades. It promptly declared a firm
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis that embraced Judicial
Committee decisions right up to 1949, and although there were
some indications of a more generous reading of federal
legislative authority and even a string of cases showing greater
sympathy on human rights issues,' 9 on closer inspection these
really did not add up to very much. Law professor Bora Laskin
(as he then was) decried the Court's embrace of its English
captivity. 20 Disappointment was compounded by the Supreme
Court's handling of the 1960 Diefenbaker Bill of Rights,21 a
piece of ordinary federal legislation (and therefore not binding
on the provinces) that is regarded as a quasi-constitutional
halfway house to an entrenched rights document. The Supreme
Court effectively eviscerated this measure, sometimes by
observing that on its face it simply acknowledged previously
existing rights rather than creating new ones, and sometimes by
invoking the principle of supremacy of Parliament to keep it
from having an impact on subsequent legislation.22
In short, the new beginning of 1949 turned out to be not
very much of a new beginning after all.
19. For a discussion of this line of cases, see McCormick, supra n. 11, at ch. 3.
20. Bora Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians,
29 Canadian Bar Rev. 1038, 1075 (1951) (noting that the Supreme Court had "for too long
been a captive court so that it is difficult, indeed, to ascribe any body of doctrine to it
which is distinctively its own, save, perhaps, in the field of criminal law").
21. See An Act for the Recognition & Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 1960 c. 44.
22. See e.g. Ian Green, The Charter of Rights 24-25 (James Lorimer & Co. 1989).
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C. The "Modern" Supreme Court of Canada
The 1970s are a watershed decade for the Canadian court
system in general and for the Supreme Court in particular; a
court system that had hardly changed since Confederation (the
only major innovation had been the development of Family
Courts and Juvenile Courts early in the twentieth century) was
transformed from top to bottom. A full catalogue of these
changes is beyond the scope of this paper, but the changes to the
Supreme Court itself were striking.
The first change was a transformation of the credentials of
the typical Supreme Court Justice to emphasize appellate
experience, an academic connection, and some demonstration of
public service, with the new judges adopting a new style of
decisionmaking (the Supreme Court's own term is
"contextualism") and a new mode of explanatory justification
that is far more expansive and accessible than pre-1970s
practices. Although the transition was not a smooth one-I often
use the phrase "the great Laskin-Martland wars"23 to describe
the decade of the 1970s, as the new style of judging gradually
displaced the older formalism-a steady attrition of the longer-
serving judges meant that by the end of the decade, the new
style was firmly entrenched and has not been subsequently
challenged.
The second change was the shift in the balance of the
Supreme Court docket between appeals by right and appeals by
leave. Before 1975 most of the Supreme Court caseload was
composed of appeals by right, which lay with the losing party in
any civil case involving more than $10,000 and any criminal
case involving major charges. As might be expected, the effect
was to push the Supreme Court caseload steadily upward, and
therefore the amount of time and attention that the Supreme
Court could apply to any specific case steadily downward; the
sensible strategy for dispatching this caseload was to use the
23. The reference is to Bora Laskin, who joined the Court in 1970, and was its Chief
Justice from 1973 to 1983, and Ronald Martland, who served on the Court from 1958 to
1982. As seniority has always been an important consideration in naming the Chief Justice,
one can only conclude that Martland, then the senior member of the Court, was deliberately
passed over when Laskin was named Chief Justice in 1973. This slight may have added to
the tensions between the two.
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minimum five-judge panel for the vast majority of cases,
reserving larger panels for unusually important occasions. But as
the Supreme Court began its second century, the Supreme Court
Act was amended to shrink the category of appeals by right
(essentially, to criminal cases in which there is a dissent on a
question of law in the provincial court of appeal, or in which the
court of appeal has allowed a Crown appeal from an acquittal).24
The implications of this second change are two-fold. First,
the Court can control the timing of most matters that appear
before it, developing a long-term (or at least a medium-term)
strategy rather than simply reacting to cases; this capacity for
strategic choices is enhanced by the fact that since 1963 the
Supreme Court's policy has been to conference after every set of
oral arguments to deliberate on the matters before it. Second,
because the Supreme Court can largely control the size of its
own docket, it can deploy its limited resources more effectively
on a smaller set of more important matters, signalled by the
steady rise in the size of the average panel (and arguably also by
a steady growth in the length of the Court's reasons for
judgement).
The third change-the most visible and the most important,
but only because it could build upon the first two-was the 1982
constitutional entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, representing a shift from the traditional values of
parliamentary supremacy to the new values of constitutional
(some would say "judicial") supremacy.25 Two developments
that were controversial in the United States-the Marshall
Court's establishment of judicial review,26 and the Warren
Court's shift to a broad and socially progressive notion of
entrenched rights27-have been less controversial in Canada
because they are directly sanctioned by the Canadian text,
through both the "supreme law" terminology of Section 52 of
24. The original listing of appeals by right appears in the Criminal Code at [R.S. 1985,
c. C-46], s. 691, which was narrowed by the amendment appearing at 1997, c. 17.
25. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted as Part I of the Constitution Act
1982. See supra n. 5.
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that it is "emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
27. See e.g. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (recognizing a right to attend
desegregated public schools).
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the Constitution Act 1982,28 and the transparently open-ended
terminology of some sections of the Charter (most notably the
"un-enumerated rights" of the Section 15 equality rights).29
The combination of these three developments, under the
leadership of a string of unusually prominent Chief Justices, has
created an extremely powerful Court that enjoys such a strong
base in public opinion as to be, for all practical purposes,
immune to direct political confrontation. And (to bring us full
circle from my opening comments) in the process it has
heightened the institutional similarities of the Canadian and
American Supreme Courts, both of which deploy judicial review
(sometimes aggressively) in the defence of a set of
constitutionally entrenched values including an extensive charter
of rights, with a willingness to over-rule and frustrate
democratically elected legislatures in the process. The counter-
majoritarian difficulty-the fact that judicial review gives a
formally unaccountable body appointed from an elite profession,
and not the elected representatives of the citizen public, the final
word on many matters of law and public policy-is blunted by
the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada and the substance of
its decisions enjoy wide public support, especially among the
social and political and legal elites.
3F
IV. THE APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
A. Pre-1970
Section 4.2 of the Supreme Court Act provides that the
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada "shall be appointed by
28. "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of
no force or effect." Constitution Act 1982 § 52(1).
29. "Every individual is equal before the law and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination." Id. at § 15(1).
30. The two issues that have come the closest to provoking a backlash have been the
"rape shield" provisions for sexual assault trials and the "kiddie por" issue. See R. v.
Seaboyer [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (addressing provisions prohibiting the use of the
complainant's sexual history in a prosecution for rape); R. v. Sharpe [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45
(addressing the regulation of child pornography).
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the Governor in Council by letters patent under the Great Seal."
In Canadian practice, however, the phrase "Governor in
Council" does not actually mean the Governor-General, but
rather the federal cabinet giving the Governor-General advice
that to all intents and purposes cannot be refused. And the
critical thing about the advice-giving cabinet is that it has always
been dominated by the Prime Minister (never more so than in
recent decades), although the Minister of Justice is usually
involved in the judicial appointment process as well, and at
some points (such as the late 1960s) may well have been
afforded a considerable discretion in this regard.
There are only two formal restraints on the discretion of the
appointing minister or ministers. The first is that the person
appointed must have been a judge of a superior court, or a
lawyer (a "barrister or advocate") of at least ten years standing
in the bar of a province. The second is that three of the judges
must be from the bar of the province of Quebec; 3 1 although only
Quebec is singled out in the legislation, a very strong convention
has extended the principle to assign every seat on the court to a
specific region. It is almost invariably the case that three of the
judges on the Court will be from the Ontario bar, one will be
from one of the four Atlantic provinces, and two will be from
the four western provinces (possibly refined to a rule that one
will be from British Columbia, and one will be drawn in rotation
from the three Prairie provinces).32
There are two general observations that can be made about
appointments to the Supreme Court before 1970. The first is that
a partisan political connection was often a significant and visible
factor. As Brown has observed, "Of the fifty justices appointed
before 1949, twenty-two had been politicians." 33 Some (such as
Abbot in 1954) were appointed straight out of the federal
cabinet; others (like J.W. Estey in 1944 and Rand in 1943)
31. Between 1875 and 1928, the requirement was two Quebec judges on a six-judge
court; between 1928 and 1949, it was two Quebec judges on a seven-judge court. The
current "three of nine" was established in 1949.
32. The single exception to this general pattern since 1949 was the appointment of
McIntyre (British Columbia) to replace Spence (Ontario) in 1979, briefly dropping Ontario
to two judges and pushing the West up to three; this was corrected in 1982 by appointing
Wilson (Ontario) to the vacancy created by the retirement of Martland (Alberta).
33. R. Blake Brown, The Supreme Court of Canada and Judicial Legitimacy: The Rise
and Fall of Chief.Justice Lyman Poore Duff, 47 McGill L.J. 559, 566 (2002).
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directly from provincial cabinet posts; still others had served in
the federal Parliament (Crockett in 1932 and Hudson in 1936) or
provincial legislatures (Taschereau in 1940, Cannon in 1930).
Even where such direct service was absent, personal connections
to politically important figures were often significant.
The second is that prior judicial service was not particularly
important. About half of the pre-1970 appointments, including
two of the post-war Chief Justices, had never served as judges
before joining the nation's highest court. Even where there was
prior judicial service, it was slightly more likely to have been
trial court experience than appellate court experience, and often
it had been very brief.
B. Post-1970
The decade of the 1970s saw a complete transformation of
the Canadian judicial system, so pronounced and pervasive that I
refer to it as the "Great Canadian Judicial Revolution." One of
the aspects of this change was the way in which judges were
appointed to all levels of Court, including the Supreme Court.
These practices have continued to evolve in the following
decades, and my comments that follow will not deal with these
incremental changes but more generally with the current
procedures.
The critical date was the appointment of Pierre Trudeau as
Minister of Justice in 1967; after Trudeau became Prime
Minister, John Turner and Otto Lang later served in the Justice
portfolio and continued the changes. As a result of those
changes, the general approach to all federal judicial
appointments can now be summarized as (1) an expanded
process for generating a list of names for consideration; (2) the
collection of relevant information including (where appropriate)
prior judicial performance; and (3) wide consultation with a
variety of legal, judicial, and political professionals. For
provincial superior court judges, this evolved into a judicial
appointments advisory committee struck for each province to
consider candidates and recommend a short list; for Supreme
Court judges, this last step was suggested by the Canadian Bar
Association but rejected.
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The current process for appointments to the Supreme Court
was described by the Commons committee as follows:
[T]he consultative process is comprised of two key steps. In
the first step, the Minister of Justice identifies potential
candidates. Such candidates typically sit on provincial
Courts of Appeal, although names can also be drawn from
senior members of the Bar or from academia. Any
interested person may also put a name forward for
consideration. The Minister specifically consults with the
following individuals when assembling his or her list of
candidates: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Canada and sometimes the puisne judges, the Chief
Justice(s) of the court(s) from the province or region with
the vacancy, the Attorney(s) General of the province or
region, and at least one senior member of the Canadian Bar
Association and the law society from the relevant region.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada is also
consulted about the needs of the Court.
34
There is sometimes an additional element to the process. It
is not unknown for certain constituencies to react to (or, given
the mandatory retirement age of 75, to anticipate) a vacancy on
the Supreme Court by putting pressure on the government in
support of specific candidates, pressure that can operate behind
the scenes (working on the participants indicated above) or more
openly, in the form of laudatory letters or articles in professional
or public media.
The introduction of the new procedures in the 1970s was
accompanied by a significant change in the credentials of the
typical Supreme Court of Canada judge. This change has
survived a string of Prime Ministers (Trudeau, Clark, Mulroney,
Chrdtien, Martin) and four changes in government, which
suggests that we can realistically treat it as permanent shift
rather than temporary aberration. The new emphasis is on prior
judicial experience at the appellate level,35 familiarity with the
34. House of Commons Standing Comm. on Justice, Human Rights, Pub. Safety and
Emerg. Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process
Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness 3 (May 2004) (available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
InfocomDoc/Documents/37/3/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/justrpOl-e.htm) (accessed
Feb. 24, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
35. All but five of the twenty-seven Supreme Court judges appointed since 1967 were
elevated from the (provincial, or more rarely, the federal) courts of appeal.
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academic as well as the practical aspects of law,36 and a concern
for public service, but not partisan political service.37 As Snell
and Vaughan point out, the Trudeau justices were "the most
learned and scholarly set of judges ever to join the Supreme
Court."38
Most lawyers, academics, and other commentators would
agree that the changes in both process and substance have been
positive; few, if any, would favor a return to the older practices.
However, three aspects of these changes need to be highlighted.
First, the procedures are not particularly transparent, and
appointments are made without any indication of how the names
came up, or who was consulted, or which qualities and
experiences the evaluation of judicial performance revealed as
the candidate's strengths or possible weaknesses. Second, the
practices are conventional and voluntary, not formalized in
legislative (let alone constitutional) form. And third, they were
introduced at the fiat of a particular political leader (or trio of
political leaders) without any broader discussion or approval or
formal ratification. We therefore cannot say that the current
appointment process is innocuous because no Prime Minister
and cabinet would ever "stack" the Supreme Court with a
particular set of qualities and attitudes. To the contrary, it is
unambiguously true that Trudeau, Turner, and Lang did stack
the Court, utterly and irreversibly transforming it in the process;
general approval of the "stacking" does nothing to neutralize the
power or its potential to work harm instead of good.
V. CONCERNS ABOUT THE APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES TO THE SCC
Peter Russell has described Canada as "the only
constitutional democracy in the world in which the leader of
government has an unfettered discretion to decide who will sit
36. Four of the last twenty-seven Supreme Court justices had served as Deans of
Faculties of Law: Beetz (appointed 1974), Le Dain (1984), La Forest (1985), and
Bastarache (1997); a number of others (such as Laskin and Sopinka) were academics of
considerable reputation.
37. None of the last twenty-seven Supreme Court judges had served as members of
provincial or federal legislatures or cabinets, but a number had served as public servants, as
special counsel to governments, or on Law Reform Commissions.
38. Snell & Vaughan, supra n. 13, at 236.
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on the country's highest court., 3 9 To say this is simply to make
an observation about constitutional design, not to impugn any
specific actions of those who do the appointing or to belittle the
capacities of those they appoint. We can take Russell's
statement as setting out the essential core of the problem:
Canada has never really worked through the implications of
wedding (in Ted Morton's terms) an American-style
interventionist court with a traditionally English style of
appointing judges.4 ° This is simply bad institutional design.
But it is not enough to describe the current procedures as
deficient; what is necessary is to spell out why they are
deficient, and what dimensions of a fully adequate appointment
process are being ignored. I would suggest that there are six
different dimensions that need to be identified and addressed,
these being the professional dimension, the federal dimension,
the political dimension, the representation dimension, the
accountability and transparency dimension, and the
independence dimension.
A. The Professional Dimension
The professional dimension is the most thoroughly
addressed by the current process. For one thing, the federal
Department of Justice evaluates the credentials, the
performance, and the reputation of all candidates. For a second,
the comments of a number of provincial superior court judges
and of the provincial justice department are actively solicited for
any candidates who are being seriously considered for
appointment or elevation to the Supreme Court. For a third, the
Canadian Bar Association-the national professional
organization for Canadian lawyers-has the opportunity to
submit its own evaluation. And finally, almost all of the
appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada over the last three
decades have served (sometimes for considerable periods) on
39. Peter Russell, A Parliamentary Approach to Reforming the Process of Filling
Vacancies on the Supreme Court of Canada I Br. to Standing Comm. on Justice, Human
Rights, Pub. Safety and Emerg. Preparedness (Mar. 23, 2004).
40. F.L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A System in
Transition 1, Presentation. to Standing Comm. on Justice, Human Rights, Pub. Safety and
Emerg. Preparedness (Apr. 1, 2004).
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provincial or federal courts of appeal before their elevation,
providing everyone associated with the appointments process
ample opportunity to assess their competence, their
professionalism, and their performance. This four-pronged
scrutiny is fully appropriate; the first requirement for any
member of a national high court is surely a knowledge of the
law and a demonstrated capacity for solid judicial performance.
But although this is arguably the preemptive consideration,
the hurdle that must be cleared before anything else enters the
calculations, it is not enough in itself. It is regularly said of new
Supreme Court appointees-including the two appointed in
August 2004-that they are simply the best candidates for the
job, and the finest judges in the country. Without denying that
they are among the best, and while fully understanding the
institutional functionality of such hyperbole, I think it is
important to unravel the rhetoric a little.
What does it mean to say that something or someone is "the
best"? There is no Olympic-style competition for judges, but it
is possible to invent one. Suppose we could identify a string of
objective measurable components of good judicial performance
in intermediate appellate courts-factors such as the rate at
which judges clear their writing assignments, their reversal rate
when their own decisions are appealed, and the frequency with
which they are cited by their own and other similar courts.
41. This thought experiment has been thoroughly examined in a series of papers by
Stephen Choi of the University of California at Berkeley's Boalt Hall Law School and
Mitu Gulati of the Georgetown Law Center. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr.
Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, _ N.Y.U. Ann. Survey Am. L. _
(forthcoming 2005) (abstract and link to full article available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstractid=647738) (abstract and article accessed Mar. 6, 2005; copy of
abstract on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu
Gulati, A Tournament of Judges? 92 Cal. L. Rev. 299 (2004); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu
Gulati, Who Would Win a Tournament of Judges, Boalt Working Papers in Pub. L., No. 19
(available at http//repositories.cdlib.org/boaltwp/19) (accessed Feb. 16, 2005; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Performance,
U. Cal. Berkeley Pub. L. Research Paper No. 141 (abstract and link to full article available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=473281) (abstract and article
accessed Feb. 16, 2004; copy of abstract on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process). Their suggestions have been (to put it mildly) controversial, provoking extended
discussion on a number of law blogs and, most recently, a symposium. See generally
Symposium: Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2005).
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Suppose we could gain consensus within the judicial and
professional community on both the elements to be measured
and the weighting to be assigned to each one. At any given
moment, we would then have to plug the numbers in, run the
program, and see who came out with the highest score-and
when there was a vacancy on the Supreme Court, that would be
the winning judge's prize.
But of course, this is not how it is actually done. It would
be futile to ask the federal Department of Justice for the sets of
scores to validate the Justice Minister's claims. One could argue
that it couldn't be done because we could never come up with all
the things that really matter, or totally objective ways to measure
them, or presumptively credible ways of weighting them. And it
has been argued that it shouldn't be done. Solum, paying Choi
and Gulati the left-handed compliment of coming up with "that
rare and wonderful thing: an idea that is both completely wrong
and wonderfully illuminating," worries that the apparently
objective measures are all proxy rather than direct measures, and
could be manipulated and "gamed" with undesirable
42
consequences.
What is really going on in terms of the professional
dimension is something rather different, worthy in its own right
but somewhat more modest. To make a slightly extravagant
comparison: When the cardinals go into conclave to elect a new
pope, Vaticanologists can always identify the "papabile"-the
really serious candidates, the men who could become pope. To
coin a term: they are "pope-able." Similarly it is reasonable to
think that legal professionals could identify the strongest
members of any court of appeal, the ones we could think of as
"supreme-able." But just as every conclave has several papabile
but, in the end, only one new pope, so for any vacancy on the
Supreme Court there will be an indefinite number of credible
candidates but only one who can wear the ermine robe. We are
really talking about a merit threshold that yields a surplus of
candidates, and therefore the professional-merit argument gives
42. Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. -
(forthcoming 2005) (referring to the work of Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, citations to
which are collected above in note 41) (abstract and link to full article available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=588322) (abstract and article accessed
on Feb. 16, 2004; abstract on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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us a pool of possibles, not a clear-cut single winner. This being
the case, so long as the process honours the establishment of a
solid merit threshold, nothing is compromised by ensuring that
other elements are appropriately acknowledged as well.
B. The Federal Dimension
One of the important functions of a national high court with
the power of judicial review is to interpret, apply, and enforce
the constitutional division of legislative authority between the
various levels of government. This, of necessity, is a job that is
never complete; the Supreme Court of Canada has in recent
years been refining this jurisprudence, with regard to both
longstanding if slightly esoteric issues of Canadian
constitutional law (such as the relatively recent activation of a
long-empty "second branch" of the trade and commerce power
first hinted at by the Judicial Committee in 1881), and new or
newly salient issues such as the environment. 43 But if this is a
shifting border that must be policed and updated, then it is
anomalous in the extreme for one of the levels of government to
have unfettered discretionary control over the entire membership
of the allegedly neutral refereeing body, and professionalism
alone cannot be a complete answer if the process suggested in
the previous section leaves a selection zone within which
"centralists" can be systematically favoured over
"provincialists."
To be sure, this is not the Court's only function. It is also
responsible for error correction and judicial leadership bearing
on general questions of law, and for two decades it has protected
a set of individual rights from governmental interference. But
even if the list of duties is more extensive than it might once
have been, federalism issues are still important enough to be
addressed in the appointment process. The American solution
was to require the consent by the upper chamber of the national
legislature, envisaged by the Constitution's framers as a type of
43. See e.g. Gen. Motors Canada v. City Natl. Leasing [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (addressing
trade and commerce power); R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401
(addressing environmental issues).
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"states house" within the national process;44 Canada did not
follow suit, and in any event its upper chamber is, to put it
mildly, not a credible counterpart.
The last time that Canadians considered broad
constitutional change, the Supreme Court was on the agenda and
it was the federalism issue that drove the discussions. This
occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s, when Conservative
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney spent most of his nine years in
office in the ultimately futile pursuit of a constitutional package
that would overcome Quebec's rejection of (and continued
rhetorical attack on) the 1982 constitutional settlement. Legally,
of course, the new constitutional provisions were as valid and
binding on Quebec as on the other provinces, but politically, the
issue represented a standing invitation to Quebec separatists to
exploit Quebec's isolation and humiliation. Both the early
"Meech Lake" package and the subsequent "Charlottetown"
package (both named for the locations in which the critical
meetings took place) would have had the Prime Minister making
Supreme Court appointments from lists of nominees submitted
by provincial premiers. However, both sets of constitutional
proposals failed (consuming almost a decade of political energy
and attention in the process) and ultimately nothing came of the
idea.
C. The Representation Dimension
For most of the Court's history, the basic characteristics of
its justices were easily described: They were middle-aged (or
older) white professional males of British or French ethnicity.
Some modest regional representation was provided by the
statutory requirement that three judges be appointed from the
bar of the province of Quebec and the conventional expectation
that the other seats would be similarly drawn in predictable ways
44. It is, of course, an open question whether the United States Senate is in the modem
era a "states house" in a way that would satisfy the federalism concerns that I am raising,
but I am making the smaller point that at the time of the drafting of the United States
Constitution, it was seen in this light. See e.g. Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peoples,
Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 141-43
(1996) (suggesting that the so-called Connecticut Compromise-which provided for two
senators from each state-was regarded by the Founders as a means of ensuring that the
government outlined in the Constitution would survive).
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from other identifiable regions. There has also been some
suggestion of further representation complexities-for example,
that at least one of the non-Quebec judges shall be francophone
(examples would include LeDain, La Forest, Arbour,
Bastarache, and most recently Charron). The reverse
convention-that one of the Quebec judges would be an
anglophone-seemed to have gone into suspension after the
1954 appointment of Abbott, but may have been revived by the
2004 appointment of Fish.
More recently, the matter has become more complex. The
first Jewish judge was Bora Laskin, appointed in 1970, and Fish
became the second Jewish member of the Supreme Court in
2004, joined by Abella later the same year. The first woman,
Bertha Wilson, was appointed in 1982, and has been followed
by L'Heureux-Dub6 in 1987, McLachlin in 1989, Arbour in
1999, Deschamps in 2003, Abella in 2004, and Charron in 2004.
John Sopinka, a Ukrainian-Canadian, was (apart from Laskin)
the first person appointed who was not clearly of British or
French descent, and Frank Iacobucci, an Italian-Canadian, was
the second.45
One must acknowledge, however, that representational
factors, however defensible and well-intentioned, inevitably
complicate the professionalism of a merit-based system. What if
the best woman candidate, or a credible potential Asian-
Canadian judge, or the only available native Canadian judge, is
from the wrong region? And what if the objectively best judges
at the occasion of any vacancy, over and over again, are sitting
on the Ontario Court of Appeal, easily and always the country's
strongest provincial court of appeal?
4
But the problem really starts one step earlier: How do we
decide (and who decides) what group deserves a turn? At the
moment, we can only be observers trying to guess what is going
on behind the closed doors. One can only tell after the fact
45. Similarly, the last thirty years has seen the first woman Governor-General (Jeanne
Sauv6), the first European-but-not-British-or-French Governor-General (Ed Schreyer), and
the first Asian-Canadian Governor-General (Adrienne Clarkson).
46. This is not an idle question. Australia's seven-judge High Court, for example, is
usually dominated by judges from New South Wales; although it has never been the case
that every single member of the Court has been from that state, it has several times come
very close, as the biographies of the High Court's current and former justices make clear.
See http://www.hcourt.gov.au/justices.html (accessed Feb. 17, 2004).
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which groups deserve continued representation (such that they
get a new representative when somebody leaves),47 and which
groups have to wait their turn to enjoy sporadic representation in
some grander cycle,48 and which groups are still waiting to pass
the threshold.49 And how hard do we push to represent the
groups that have emerged: Do we have firm quotas? "Tie
breakers" in favor of the group in question? "Bonus points"
awarded to pre-empt tight races? Only the opacity of the current
process, and the tentative nature of the representational list itself
and of the relative priority of its various elements, prevent these
questions from being discussed directly. Indeed, when
announcing the two most recent appointments, the Minister of
Justice explicitly (and not very credibly) denied that any concern
for representation issues influenced the choices in any way.
Although it is a problem that there is no firm rule as to
which groups deserve how much representation with what
degree of priority, it would be unwise to solve that problem by
stipulating representational requirements in the legislation, let
alone the constitution, because it would tend to "freeze" the
institution to match the priorities of one passing political
moment. As Pildes observes, "one of the iron laws of democratic
institutions is that institutional structures, once created, become
refractory to change."
50
This concern apart, the representation element fits well
with a formal nomination process; emulating some of the
mechanisms for choosing judges used by some international
courts, we could direct either the voting of each member of the
nominating commission, or the outcome itself, by stipulating
47. The assumption that there are three seats that "belong" to women was put in doubt
when Wilson was not replaced by a woman in 1992; it was revived by the fact that Arbour
was so replaced in 2004, although it seems premature to think of women judges having an
entitlement now of four seats.
48. We cannot quite talk of a "Jewish seat" on the Court, because it was more than
fifteen years after Laskin's death that a second Jewish judge was appointed; but the
appointment of a second Jewish judge in 2003, not to mention a third in 2004, suggests that
this group is "in the mix" for occasional representation on the Court.
49. Just as the United States is awaiting the appointment of its first Native-American,
Latino, or Asian-American justice, knowing it is only a matter of time, so Canada is
awaiting the appointment of its first Asian-Canadian justice or its first justice from the First
Nations.
50. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 28, 84 (2004).
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that the list must include at least one woman, at least one man, at
least one person whose ethnic origin is neither French nor
English, and so on. Absent such a mechanism, there is often a
tendency to assume that the current set of incumbents being
meritorious, the merit criterion directs one to find candidates
who are as much like them as possible. But such an attitude
necessarily creates a barrier to minorities of all kinds.
D. The Accountability and Transparency Dimension
The current process of seeking evaluative input from a
fairly wide range of responsible professionals is, of course, a
critically important dimension. But the problem is that it is to all
intents and purposes invisible. This means that the appointment
of a Supreme Court justice in Canada takes the form of a period
of building speculation about the possible alternatives (to such
an extent that the media can publish lists of possible names with
the alleged odds of their success). The speculation is resolved
(sometimes after some delay) by the announcement of the name
of the new judge, which is followed by a brief celebration of the
appointment. Then, the professional media comments
enthusiastically on the credentials and personal history of a
person who was, for most members of the public, totally
unknown until that moment.
The ex post facto rationale is desirable, but it is really
answering the wrong question. We want to know, from the
background facts of education and experience and prior
decisions delivered, that the new judge will be competent-or
better-on the highest court, but we also want to know what
there is about this particular candidate that made him or her
more deserving of the honour and responsibility than the dozen
or hundred other judges who might have been picked instead.
We need some idea of what kept some people off the short lists
and other people on, of what put people at the top of the list and
at the bottom, and who was translating these factors into specific
decisions. And apart from the (possible) involvement of the
Minister of Justice and the (definite) final discretionary decision
of the Prime Minister, we know nothing of this save in the
vaguest and most platitudinous of terms. It may well be that the
right people are involved, that they are making their decisions
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on defensible criteria, and that their advice is strictly followed
by the politicians, with purely professional considerations
always being preemptive-but since we do not know that this is
the case, we have to take it on faith, and this phrase is the very
antithesis of transparency.
One argument against more transparency is the suggestion
that judges who are considered but passed over will suffer
embarrassment, and possibly even a diminution of reputation.
The suggestion seems exaggerated (surely one could just as
easily argue that judges who are passed over will be gratified by
the knowledge that they were on some formal short-list), and in
any event the supposed embarrassment would seem to be
triggered just as much by the current media speculation as it
might be by the institution of a more formal process.
The flip-side of the lack of transparency is an effective lack
of accountability. In a democracy, one can always say that a
government stands or falls on its actions, and the voters can hold
it to account at the next election, but the next election is often
years away, and events like wars joined or not joined, economies
surging or sagging, and valued major programs threatened or
promised usually loom far larger. At any rate, the time lag for
the effective evaluation of a Supreme Court justice is such as to
vitiate such democratic responsiveness. Over the last five years,
the two most significant members of the Supreme Court of
Canada were clearly McLachlin and Iacobucci, neither of whom
was appointed by the current government, let alone the current
Prime Minister, and the two judges appointed in the summer of
2004 will both still be serving in 2020, by which time the Prime
Minister who appointed them is most unlikely to be in office.
E. The Partisan Political Dimension
It is widely accepted in American scholarship that there is a
partisan dimension to the selection of judges, and this partisan
dimension has significant ideological overtones. If there had
been any doubt about this, the Bork nomination would have
dispelled it. Curiously, in Canada this is widely denied; there are
critical voices insisting on the matter, but they are generally
from the margins and from outside the legal profession. The
general assumption is that judges leave their ideology and their
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political connections at the door (or at least the definition of a
good judge includes the capacity to do so), and therefore given
an adequate screening mechanism we do not need to worry
about these matters.
There are probably two reasons for this attitude. The first
may be the English style, which always treated the courts as
apolitical and the judges as neutral and above politics. The
plausibility of this contention in England was enhanced by (or
even purely the artefact of) the very narrow pool from which
high court judges were recruited, creating a group of judges and
potential judges who were extremely homogeneous in terms of
class, social circumstances, and education. The second (and
more specifically Canadian) reason for accepting this assertion
is that for much of our history, and certainly for the last four or
five decades, the two major Canadian political parties have not
differed consistently or significantly on ideological grounds, so
this has never been an axis over which the selection of judges
has ever organized itself on an extended basis. 52 The last time
that the Supreme Court divided regularly on the basis of who
had appointed them was the 1970s, as the "Trudeau judges"
(Laskin, Spence, Dickson) gradually took control from the
"Diefenbaker judges" (Martland, Ritchie, Judson); since then,
the question of which Prime Minister of which party appointed
the judges has not been a significant factor in the apparent
formation of voting blocs.
In the federal general election of 2004, this particular veil
was almost pierced. The old Progressive Conservative party has
vanished, and the new Conservative party has a pedigree that
gave it more ideological separation than usual.53 One of the sub-
51. See e.g. J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana Paperbacks 1981).
52. We often talk about Canadian politics as if Liberals and Progressive Conservatives
were simply the northern counterparts of Democrats and Republicans, but this has never
been true. The formula for success in Canadian politics is firmly to occupy the centre of the
political spectrum, leaning slightly left or slightly right as circumstances require; and the
major parties have competed for this advantaged position not by staking out a permanent
ideological position but by manoeuvring opportunistically around each other. The
Conservatives had their "red Tories" and the Liberals had their business and corporate
wing; only if these groups had changed places could the parties have approached
ideological consistency.
53. The Canadian political party system is going through an evolution that defies
simple explanation. The Progressive Conservative Party collapsed as a major political force
in the 1993 election, squeezed out of Quebec by the Bloc Qu~bdcois and replaced in
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themes of the campaign, particularly when it briefly seemed that
the Liberals might be replaced in office, was a concern about the
kind of judicial appointments that a new Conservative Prime
Minister would make; but instead of opening up a debate on the
dangers of broad Prime Ministerial discretion, let alone an
awareness that it involved a value-driven choice directed toward
generally predictable consequences, this just seemed to suggest
that there were some decisions so sensitive and important that
the new party could not be trusted with them.
F. The Independence Dimension
One could argue that, strictly speaking, there is no
independence dimension to the appointment debate, because
judicial independence is a question of institutional arrangements
dealing with judges after they have been appointed.
Traditionally, the Anglo-American tradition has seen these as
including security of tenure, financial security, and non-
interference with adjudicatory matters; recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada have been extending this list to
include salaries, facilities, and curbs on the powers of chief
judges.54 However, a complete insulation of the pre-appointment
period from what follows is not possible; for example,
independence would surely be compromised if a judge were
appointed only after promising to decide a particular case (or a
particular set of cases) in a specific way.
But the principle takes us farther than that. As Choudhry
points out, the basic message of the Remuneration Reference,
the Supreme Court decision that radically expanded the notion
of judicial independence in Canada, 55 was that government must
not have the potential to put pressure on the judges by reducing
(or declining to increase) judicial salaries when they do not like
Western Canada by the more ideologically strident Reform Party (which later became the
Canadian Alliance). In 2004, what was left of the Progressive Conservatives merged with
the Alliance, but it will be some time before anyone can say with assurance whether this
represented the co-optation or the final success of the challengers.
54. See Peter McCormick, New Questions About an Old Concept: The Supreme Court
of Canada's Judicial Independence Decisions, 37 Canadian J. Political Sci. 1 (2004).
55. Reference re Remuneration of Provincial Ct. Judges of P.E.l., [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
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the trend of decisions.56  By extension, having judicial
promotions subject to some kind of parliamentary review would
create the same problem: In effect, judges' career prospects
would be enhanced or confined by the legislators' reactions to
their judicial performance.
The thrust of Choudhry's argument is the implications of
the principle for Parliament, and he is critical of the idea that
parliamentary committees should play any real role. But surely
the point can be made even more strongly with reference to the
political executive, which in a parliamentary system always
plays the dominant role. Legislators may be subject to short-
term politically motivated sensationalism or over-reaction, but it
is governments that can have long-term agendas. Nor is the
concern simply theoretical: The research of Salzberger and Fenn
led them to suggest that promotions from the English Court of
Appeal to the House of Lords demonstrably reward compliant
judges and punish the critics,57 and Ramseyer and Rasmusen
suggest that such considerations are so pervasive in the Japanese
court system as to seriously undermine judicial independence in
that country."
This is just a small introduction to a very large issue. The
point is, as the Economist recently editorialized, "the
independence of the judiciary depends on the way judges are
selected."59 The principle of judicial independence puts some
constraints upon the methods that we use to appoint our judges;
this is particularly important when the people we are considering
for such appointment are already judges of provincial or federal
courts of appeal, as is almost always the case for the Supreme
Court of Canada.
60
56. Sujit Choudhry, Judging Supreme Court Judges-Finding a New Way to Pick Them
That's Legal Might Not Be Easy, Montreal Gazette D8 (Apr. 25,2004).
57. Eli Salzberger & Paul Fenn, Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the
English Court of Appeal, 42 J. L. & Economics 831 (1999).
58. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence: The
Political Economy of Judging in Japan (U. Chicago Press 2003).
59. Economist 11 (Nov. 15, 2003). The specific proposal under discussion was that
judges would be appointed by an independent commission that is itself appointed by a non-
partisan body, and the suggestion drawing the editorial ire was that the government might
under some circumstances be able to veto a judicial appointment
60. Calabresi sees the emergence of a "career judiciary," and consequently of judges
who may have some real desire to be promoted, as a significant problem for judicial
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VI. TOwARD A SOLUTION: COMPETING MODELS
A. Expanded Consultation: A Prime Minister's Court
For those who are not convinced by the complaints of the
critics-and this would include much of the organized legal
profession-there is no need for major reform, and all that is
required is at most to refine some details of the current practice.
For them, the primary consideration is professional merit, and
this is best served by a process that involves the collection of
information by the legal professionals in the Justice department,
input from the organized bar (specifically the Canadian Bar
Association), and a decision made by the Prime Minister with
the advice of the Minister of Justice (both of whom are usually
lawyers). Indeed, the current process is closely patterned on the
recommendations made by the Canadian Bar Association twenty
years ago.
This is essentially the spirit that guided the process for the
two appointments made in the summer of 2004. After the usual
consultations, ending in a decision by the Prime Minister, the
Minister of Justice announced the names of the two "nominees"
for the Supreme Court, and at the same time announced a first-
ever "parliamentary review" of the candidates. But the review
was limited to a single session held on the day after the
announcement of the nominations; it involved only a handful of
parliamentarians, and they questioned neither the candidates nor
the Prime Minister who selected them, but only the Minister of
Justice, who stated explicitly that it had not been his decision;
and the parliamentarians lacked the power to delay (let alone to
veto) the appointments. Any resemblance between this and
American-style "advise and consent" is purely superficial.
The constrained nature of the new process is obvious. Short
of an all-out assault on the professional credentials of the
candidates (an unlikely tactic at any time, doubly so for two
judges elevated from the country's most respected court of
appeal), the panel is left with nothing to talk about except the
process itself. Because the candidates were not present, one
independence. See Guido Calabr The Cwrewn Subde-and Not So Subtle-Rejection of
an Indepemdn Judiciary, 4 U. Pa. J. Const L. 637(2002).
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could hardly seek enlightenment on the values and the
conception of the judicial role that would inform their
performance of the office; because the Prime Minister who
made the selection was not present, one could hardly ask for an
elucidation of the calculations and priorities that made these
candidates preferable to their equally reputable colleagues. But
the process presumably gave the Supreme Court and its new
members a measure of publicity, and a publicization of the
consultation process that surrounded their selection-a small
"plus" in terms of legitimacy, undercut by the fact that it took
place with little notice during the summer vacation. A smaller
change could hardly be imagined, but for supporters of the status
quo, that was precisely the point.
It hardly needs to be pointed out that the Prime Minister
remains totally in charge of the selection, continuing to enjoy (as
Prime Ministers always have) the power to tilt the future of the
Supreme Court in any direction that he chooses. The hottest
topic on the Supreme Court's fall agenda is the question of
same-sex marriage, so controversial that the Prime Minister
deliberately delayed oral hearings on the reference question until
after the federal general election. One of the new Supreme Court
judges sat on the Ontario Court of Appeal panel whose ruling in
favor of same-sex marriage touched off the political
controversy, and the other is arguably the most high-profile
feminist judicial activist on the federally appointed bench. It is
simply not credible to suggest that the Prime Minister was
unaware of these facts, or that they were irrelevant to his choice;
and for the next two decades these two judges will help set the
tone and the direction of Canadian law.
B. Meech Lake and Charlottetown: A Premiers' Court
A concern for the federal dimension informed the reforms
to the Supreme Court appointment process that were seriously
considered in the late 1980s and early 1990s, although
ultimately they were abandoned. Under this process, the Prime
Minister would have been limited to making Supreme Court
appointments from (short) lists of nominees proposed by the
provincial premiers. To be sure, there was a certain lack of
clarity about the way this would have worked. When. a vacancy
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occurred for, say, Ontario, would it be only the premier of
Ontario who submitted the names of eligible judges and lawyers,
or would all the premiers have the opportunity of suggesting
names, or would it be the premiers as a collective group who
were involved? My impression is that it was the first that was
taken for granted, although this would work smoothly only for
those provinces that are understood to have either statutory or
conventional entitlement to specific Supreme Court seats:
clearly Quebec (from the statute), almost as clearly Ontario (by
strongly established convention), and possibly British
Columbia.61 It might also work for the Prairie provinces,
because it is generally understood that the seat rotates in turn
among the three provinces; the only premier involved would
presumably be the one whose province's turn was next. There is
no convention, however, for rotating the seat assigned to the
four Atlantic provinces: New Brunswick's Rand was replaced
by Nova Scotia's Ritchie in 1959, and Ritchie by New
Brunswick's La Forest in 1985, but when La Forest retired in
1997, his replacement was Bastarache, also from New
Brunswick. Prince Edward Island has not had a seat on the Court
since Davies (1901-1924), and Newfoundland & Labrador has
never had one.
Undoubtedly, something could have been worked out
(although it seems a little awkward to have three slightly
different appointment tracks for a nine-judge Court); the result
would definitely have been to restrict, even completely to
contain, Prime Ministerial discretion. To the extent that some
judges and lawyers establish reputations as "centralists" who
favor a strong reading of the powers of the national government,
we can assume that premiers would tend under this system not
to put their names on the short lists; and premiers from different
regions or parties might also have other priorities that they
would look for in the judicial record of possible candidates.
Without a uniform process presided over by a continuing set of
officials, there would probably be greater diversity in the views
of judges appointed to the high court, and possibly greater
61. 1 think of British Columbia as having one seat on the Court and the three Prairie
provinces as having a second, but many commentators continue to describe the Court in
terms of two seats normally assigned to the four Western provinces. See e.g. Hogg, supra
n. 6, at 213.
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differences in scholarly background and practice experience
among them.
But this new process would be open to a variant of the
same criticism as the one it replaced. The current problem is that
we have a national high court whose appointment process is
heavily skewed toward a single level of government, the
national government, rather than reflecting a balance between
the two levels that honours the federal principle and equips the
Court for a fair consideration of division-of-power issues. But
the Meech Lake proposals involved an appointment process that
is also skewed (albeit not quite so heavily) toward a single level
of government, the provincial governments, again failing to
reflect a considered balance. The fragmentation of the
nominating authority suggests less likelihood that the Court
could be deliberately structured in a calculated way over time,
but the mode is still predominance rather than partnership, when
what is needed is a court whose inherent design is neither
provincialist nor centralist but federal.
Rather surprisingly, the concern that was so strong a dozen
years ago has almost vanished from the current discussions. The
Commons Justice Committee received presentations from more
than a dozen individuals, but only two brought this matter up at
all, nor have the premiers (individually or collectively) seen fit
to chime in by raising the Meech Lake theme. Their silence
notwithstanding, the federal dimension represents a legitimate
concern that should be, but so far has not been, addressed by the
reform process.
C. The "American Model": A Parliament's Court
Not surprisingly, the American example often informs the
discussion of reforms to the judicial appointment procedure-
specifically the idea of a legislative ratification. In the United
States, it is the Senate that must "advise and consent" to the
President's nominations to the Supreme Court. Because the
Canadian Senate lacks the credibility and the federal and
democratic credentials that would fit it for such a role, the
suggestions are more commonly for ratification by the
Commons, or by a House of Commons committee such as the
Justice Committee.
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There are of course difficulties in translating the American
Congressional example into Canadian parliamentary form. The
first is the presence of the strongly disciplined political parties of
the Canadian form; members rarely vote against party
instructions, and would presumably be even less likely to do so
in the context of such a dramatic and significant action. The
second is the weakness of the Canadian committee system,
which displays none of the independence and cohesiveness of
Congressional committees and is subject in a number of ways to
the control of party leadership, especially of the governing party.
Only in the context of a minority government (such as Canada
now has) would there be any element of unpredictability, but
minority governments are an unusual outcome of a Canadian
election, and even then the action would be shaped by strong
parties and weak committees. Under normal circumstances, the
government of the day would dominate both the Commons and
the committee, able to guarantee any result within any time
frame that it wished. Parliamentary review might make an
important symbolic statement about the relationship between the
branches of government, but it would usually be a totally
predictable formality rather than a genuine opportunity for
political leverage.
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Although the American example is obvious, it is not
particularly attractive to Canadian lawyers or academics. The
drama of the Bork and Thomas confirmation hearings, although
not typical of such procedures, has been taken as a warning of
what an open process of legislature review could become. It
carries the obvious double dangers: Good candidates would be
reluctant to expose themselves to a partisan attack masquerading
as theoretical discussion, and even nominees who survive the
process might be damaged in reputation and diminished in
influence. And the reluctance of legal professionals in Canada to
see (or at least to admit) a partisan and ideological dimension in
the selection of judges constitutes a further hurdle;
parliamentary review seems to admit, and thereby to promote,
62. It bears noting in this discussion that the "advise and consent" function of the
United States Senate has become deadlocked of late, due to the combination of, on the one
hand, the competitive balance between the two major parties and, on the other hand, super-
majoritarian rules in the Senate that allow a party to exercise major leverage even if it falls
short of a majority of the seats.
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just such an awareness. Ratushny, one of the architects of the
current process, subscribes to a view that is in this respect
representative of the profession: Legislative review is a bad idea
that is not working well in the United States, and it would work
even less well in Canada.
63
D. The "European Model": A Partisan Court
Some commentators, such as Morton, would look
elsewhere for a useful model.64 The constitutional courts
(sometimes "constitutional councils") of Europe are deliberately
constituted as reasonably large, sometimes multi-panel,
structures having members serving definite terms, and multiple
appointing authorities interacting in such a way as consciously
and deliberately to reflect the major political and regional
divisions of the country in appropriate proportions. Shifting
political fortunes and alliances will, over time, in an open and
predictable way, be reflected in the membership of these courts.
The normal Canadian response to such a suggestion is that
it would politicize both the appointment process and the Court.
But the counter-argument would point out that to some extent it
is judicial power itself that has made the Court an important
political actor whose decisions regularly impact the lives of
many citizens, and that changing the process would not so much
politicize the system as simply bring the politics out in the open.
But the further problem is that specific judges on the court
would be identified with particular political parties or groupings;
they would have to be so connected, as otherwise it would be
impossible to ascertain which group was entitled to the
representation share created by a vacancy on the Court. Under
the present system, the partisan dimension has not been a good
predictor of voting blocs on the Court-there were no recurrent
confrontations between "Mulroney's judges" and "Chr~tien's
judges" over the last decade-but expectations, and in the long
63. See Edward J. Ratushny, Confirmation Hearings for Supreme Court of Canada
Appointments: NOT a Good Idea! in Essays in Honour of Grald-A. Beaudoin: The
Challenge of Constitutionalism ch. 18 (Pierre Thibault, Benoit Pelletier & Louis Perret,
eds., Editions Y. Blais 2002).
64. Morton, supra n. 40.
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run performance, might be changed by an openly partisan
appointment process.
There are, of course, other problems. The European
constitutional courts are formally separate from the regular court
system, and they often function less as final appellate courts
exercising concrete review than as before-the-fact advisory
bodies exercising abstract review, sometimes described as a
"third legislative chamber" rather than an Anglo-American style
supreme court.65 The multi-functionality of the national high
court in a modem common-law system makes the overtly
partisan politicization assumed in this model more problematic
in a nation like Canada.
E. An Independent Nomination Process: A Nation's Court
It seems to me that the most appropriate point at which to
deal with the various dimensions I have described is not a
ratification process (whether or not it contains the right of
rejection), but rather a nomination process. I have elsewhere
proposed the establishment of a judicial nomination
commission, whose membership would consist of three
elements. 6 6 The first would be five members of the Canadian
Judicial Council,67 chosen by and from the members; the second
would be five members of the Council of the Federation (as the
premier's conference is now styling itself)68 chosen by and from
the members; and the third would be five members of the
Commons Justice Committee, chosen by and from the
65. See Alex Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe
(Oxford U. Press 2000).
66. Peter McCormick, Presentation to Standing Comm. on Justice, Human Rights, Pub.
Safety & Emerg. Preparedness (Apr. 1, 2004) (available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/infocom
doc/37/3/JUST/Meetings/Evidence/JUSTEV09-E.HTM#Int-874267) (accessed Feb. 21,
2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
67. The Canadian Judicial Council, established in 1971, includes the chief justices and
associate chief justices of all the courts whose members are appointed by the federal
government, currently amounting to a membership of thirty-nine judges chaired by the
Chief Justice of Canada. See http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca (accessed Feb. 26, 2005; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
68. The Council of the Federation was established by the premiers on December 5,
2003, and consists of the ten provincial and three territorial premiers, with a small
secretariat in Ottawa. See http://www.councilofthefederation.ca (accessed Feb. 26, 2005;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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committee in such a way as appropriately to represent the
various political parties. 69 Struck upon the occasion of an actual
or anticipated vacancy on the Supreme Court,7 ° the committee
would have the responsibility of arriving by super-majority vote
at a list of (say) five appropriately qualified nominees for
appointment to the Supreme Court, with the Prime Minister
making the final selection from this list.
I am consciously emulating that aspect of the current
British reform proposals that aims at a "double displacement" of
the judicial nominating function, by which I mean that this
proposal specifies a set of people who will choose a second set
of people who will make the nominations, which has the
functional advantage of containing the potential for intentional
manipulation of the process. Each of the three bodies indicated
has an established existence in the Canadian political structure,
and a set of functions to which the "name the nominators"
function would be an important but (in terms of the demand
upon time and energy) a relatively minor addition. Each is
diverse in its membership: The Canadian Judicial Council
includes thirty-nine judges from trial and appeal courts in every
part of the country; the Council of the Federation includes
thirteen first ministers who are drawn from a variety of political
parties (or, in the case of the territorial governments, who enjoy
nonpartisan support); 71 and the Commons Justice Committee
includes members from all the political parties in the House of
Commons, in proportion to their representation in the Commons.
On the one hand, this independent existence and diversity should
make it impossible to "stack" the commission; on the other
hand, the research on super-majority voting requirements
suggests not only that agreement can still arise from the
69. The House of Commons Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness is one of seventeen standing committees of the House of
Commons whose members are appointed under Standing Orders for the life of a
parliament. In the 37th Parliament it consisted of a chair, a vice-chair, and sixteen
members.
70. Unlike their American counterparts, judges of the Supreme Court of Canada are not
appointed for life, but must retire on or before their seventy-fifth birthdays. Of the last six
vacancies, three (Cory, L'Heureux-Dubd, and Gonthier) were caused by the retirement age
and three (Lamer, Arbour, and Iacobucci) by decisions to resign.
71. It should be noted that in Canada, political parties, even when they share the same
name, are usually not at all integrated between different provinces or between the
provincial and national levels.
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diversity, but that the obvious need for negotiation and
compromise can create lists that go beyond the bland and the
obvious.
72
Some might prefer a longer list of organizations
contributing members to the nominating commission. The
Canadian Bar Association has played a significant role in
establishing the current process, but I see no need to represent
the organized legal profession when senior judges already make
up their share of the group. Hutchinson of Osgoode Hall Law
School, for example, has argued for some lay members, in the
name of democratic participation and openness, 73 but I am
concerned that there is no "clean" method for designating these
individuals that would be comparable to the method of choosing
"by and from" the members of an autonomous pre-existing
group. Others might want to see certain groups (the Assembly of
First Nations, or the National Action Committee on the Status of
Women, for example) naming commission members; I would
prefer to limit it to a small number of pre-existing autonomous
organizations where a diversity of membership precludes a
narrowly focused choice. But these are details; the principle that
I am advancing is that a broadly representative group whose
members are designated autonomously should do the bulk of the
work in filling a Supreme Court vacancy, limiting the political
executive to at most a final selection from a short list.
The phrase "at most" points to a possible further logical
development. The core anomaly in the current appointing
procedure is that the members of a highly independent national
high court receive their position by virtue of a lightly
constrained discretionary choice by an elected political leader,
an element of inherent politicization that simply cannot be
wished away or ignored. There is an emerging argument that
this politicization undermines the independence of the judiciary
by subordinating it to the political priorities of partisan officials.
As the British consider major changes to their judiciary, it has
72. See e.g. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons
from Europe, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1671 (2004).
73. Allan Hutchinson, Presentation to Standing Comm. on Justice, Human Rights, Pub.
Safety & Emerg. Preparedness (Apr. 1, 2004) (available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/infocom
doc/37/3/JUST/Meetings/Evidence/JUSTEVO9-E.HTM#Int-874267) (accessed Feb. 21,
2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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been argued that "the Prime Minister should end his
involvement in judicial appointments. 74 The procedure that I
am suggesting constrains the Prime Minister's choice instead,
limiting it to picking one from a list of five names. But the
model could easily be adapted to fit this imperative as well,
requiring the nomination commission to come up with a single
name.
F. The Liberal Reform Proposal: A Government's Court
In April 2005, the Minister of Justice released a proposal to
reform the appointment procedures for the Supreme Court, a
culmination of the process initiated by the legislative committee
hearings in the spring of 2004. 75 This proposal focused on the
twin responsibilities of the Supreme Court-the "powers
process" dealing with the federal/provincial distribution of
governmental power, and the "rights process" limiting the
exercise of governmental power in the protection of human
rights-and on the Canadian Supreme Court as the "exemplar of
excellence." The overarching principles informing a revised
appointment process were identified as merit, the constitutional
responsibility of the federal executive branch, judicial
independence and the integrity of the courts, transparency,
parliamentary input, and provincial input.
The core of the revised appointment process would be an
advisory committee, established as each vacancy arises. The
composition of this committee would be:
One member nominated by each political party
recognized in the House of Commons (under
current rules, every party with at least twelve
elected members), yielding, in the current
Parliament, four members;
74. Thomas Legg, Judges for the New Century, 2001 Pub. L. 62, 74.
75. Minister of Justice-Canada, Proposal to Reform the Supreme Court of Canada
Appointments Process (April 2005) (available at http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/
pub/scc/) (accessed April 19, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
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* One retired judge, nominated by the Canadian
Judicial Council;
* One member nominated by the attorney general of
the province (or jointly by the attorneys general of
the provinces within the region) for which the
appointment is to be made;
* One member nominated by the law society of the
province (or jointly by the law societies of the
provinces within the region) for which the
appointment is to be made; and
" Two lay members (neither judges nor lawyers)
nominated by the Minister of Justice.
This advisory committee, which would select a chair from
its own members, would be part of a four-stage process. The
first stage would involve the drawing up of a list of prospective
appointees by the federal Department of Justice, through the
current consultation process, which generates a pool of names
and solicits opinions on those names. Under the proposal, the
Minister would use this process to create a list of eight names
for the consideration of the advisory committee.
The second stage would centre on the advisory committee,
which is charged with conducting a "full, balanced and objective
assessment" of the eight judicial candidates, within the terms of
a "mandate letter" submitted by the Minister that would specify
the criteria to be applied, the persons to be consulted, the
requirement of written confidentiality undertakings, and several
procedural guidelines, including an absolute ban on in-person
interviews of the candidates. The Minister would attend the first
meeting of the advisory committee, and the committee would
report to the Minister on a regular basis. At the end of this stage,
the committee would present an unranked list of three
candidates, accompanied by a written commentary assessing the
strengths and weaknesses of each candidate.
The third stage would involve the Prime Minister, who
would make the selection from the three names submitted,
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although he would retain the discretionary capacity to appoint
from outside the short list should he deem it necessary.
Finally, as soon as possible after the appointment of the
new member of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice
would appear before the Justice Committee to explain the
identification and evaluative processes by which the appointee
was selected.
At first glance, this would seem to be a fairly substantial
move on the part of the government, one that has picked up on
many of the concerns that I have identified above and has
responded by constraining what is now a wide-open choice by
the Prime Minister, but on closer investigation, much of this
evaporates.
The most important consideration is that the advisory
committee is given a very narrow responsibility-cutting a list
of eight names proposed by the Minister of Justice to a list of
three names from which the Prime Minister will (possibly but
not necessarily) make his choice. The process of generating this
eight-name short list is conducted in the same way as in the past,
by the legal professionals of the federal Department of Justice
acting under the instructions of the Minister of Justice, who is
appointed by the Prime Minister. The committee has no capacity
to consider additional names of its own choosing, only to
comment on the eight names it has been supplied, and it is
specifically prohibited from meeting the judicial candidates in
person.
A second problem is that even this choice is largely
toothless. Although the committee chooses its three names,
draws up its evaluative commentary, and submits this to the
Prime Minister, he is free to ignore it. The report suggests that
this should not be done lightly, but at the same time insists that
the Prime Minister must have the complete discretion to do this
if he deems it necessary-indeed, that he should do so if there is
the slightest hint that the advisory committee may have breached
confidentiality in any way.
A third consideration is that the membership of the
committee has been kept down in the interests of creating
collegiality and quick response, but the result is it has been
significantly skewed. There are four federal politicians, two lay-
persons appointed by federal politicians, one lawyer, one retired
APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 41
judge, and one representative of the provincial attomey(s)
general-even though it is accepted up front that one major axis
of the Supreme Court's responsibility is the policing of the
jurisdictional limits of the two levels of government.
A fourth consideration is the intrusive role of the federal
Minister of Justice, who appoints several of the members, drafts
the mandate letter, sets strict limits for the procedures of the
committee, generates the "long short list" of eight judicial
candidates, attends the committee's first meeting, receives
regular reports and detailed minutes, and ensures that there have
been no violations of confidentiality.
A fifth consideration is the constant reiteration of the
constraints that are put on revisions to the appointment process
by the federal cabinet's "constitutional responsibility" for the
appointment of Supreme Court justices. But the Supreme Court
of Canada is not even entrenched in the constitution; the
appointment process regarded as so sacrosanct is contained
within an ordinary piece of federal legislation; and even if the
assertion could be taken at face value, it is still not inconsistent
with a formal process that delegates the actual narrowing of a
list to a single name. After all, it is technically the Governor-
General who does the appointing of Supreme Court justices, and
nobody suggests that her office or the credibility of the Supreme
Court is compromised by the fact that she has no choice but to
accept the name submitted to her by the Prime Minister. As
Ziegel has summed it up: "What is so striking about the federal
government's most recent proposals is the government's
neurotic obsession with perpetuating executive paternalism into
the 21st century.' 76 The Minister of Justice offers the illusion
but not the substance of reform; the contrast with the sweeping
and substantive changes to the judicial system currently being
considered by the United Kingdom is both striking and
embarrassing.
76. Jacob Ziegel, Supreme Court Selection Process Needs More Thought, Toronto
Globe & Mail (Apr. 13, 2005) (available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/
story/RTGAM.20050413.wwebcommentl2/BNStory/National/?) (accessed Apr. 19, 2005;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Prime Minister Paul Martin surprised many when he spoke
out about a democratic deficit and linked the idea to the way
Supreme Court justices are appointed, but it would be a mistake
to assume that this necessarily means that major changes are on
the horizon, or that these reform measures will enjoy a high
priority for an increasingly shaky minority government. The ad
hoc process adopted for the appointment of two new judges in
August 2004 involved minimal changes: a toothless panel of
legislators allowed on one day's notice after the appointments
had already been announced to spend a few hours throwing
questions at a person who insisted that he had not made the
decision.77 The Minister of Justice's April 2005 proposals seem
no better: a toothless advisory committee dominated by federal
politicians and federal appointees that could (if the Prime
Minister did not simply decide to ignore them) reduce the
Minister of Justice's short list of eight to a shorter list of three.
From a caricature of a U.S.-style legislative ratification, we have
progressed to a caricature of a nomination commission. The
pattern suggests that the federal government is satisfied with the
basic logic of the current process, worried only about the
superficial appearances. Months after the Prime Minister himself
opened the issue, the initiative remains in the hands of the Prime
Minister, who chooses according to his own priorities the judges
who will shape Canadian law for decades, and who is
answerable to no one for how he does so. There is no reason to
think that the situation will be any different ten years from now.
To return to my opening comments: In Canada, who will
appoint the judges? It is clear that the Prime Minister will
continue to do so, within the most inoffensive of constraints.
And who will guard this guardian? Canadians will just have to
hope that he will guard himself.
77. A newspaper columnist referred to the process, a legislative panel interviewing
neither the judges nor the politician who had selected them, as the equivalent of sending
your mother to your job interview. A Feeble New System for Screening Judges, Toronto
Globe & Mail A16 (Aug. 25, 2004) (unsigned editorial).
